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Some of the most fundamental questions concerning our evolutionary origins, our social relations, and the organization of society
are centred around issues of altruism and selﬁshness. Experimental evidence indicates that human altruism is a powerful force
and is unique in the animal world. However, there is much individual heterogeneity and the interaction between altruists and
selﬁsh individuals is vital to human cooperation. Depending on the environment, a minority of altruists can force a majority of
selﬁsh individuals to cooperate or, conversely, a few egoists can induce a large number of altruists to defect. Current gene-based
evolutionary theories cannot explain important patterns of human altruism, pointing towards the importance of both theories of
cultural evolution as well as gene–culture co-evolution.
H
uman societies represent a huge anomaly in the animal
world
1. They are based on a detailed division of labour
and cooperation between genetically unrelated individ-
uals in large groups. This is obviously true for modern
societieswiththeirlargeorganizationsandnationstates,
but it also holds for hunter-gatherers, who typically have dense
networks of exchange relations and practise sophisticated forms of
food-sharing, cooperative hunting, and collective warfare
2,3.I n
contrast, most animal species exhibit little division of labour and
cooperation is limited to small groups. Even in other primate
societies, cooperation is orders of magnitude less developed than
it is among humans, despite our close, common ancestry. Excep-
tions are social insects such as ants and bees, or the naked mole rat;
however, their cooperation is based on a substantial amount of
genetic relatedness.
Why are humans so unusual among animals in this respect? We
propose that quantitatively, and probablyeven qualitatively, unique
patterns of human altruism provide the answer to this question.
Human altruism goes far beyond that which has been observed in
the animal world. Among animals, ﬁtness-reducing acts that confer
ﬁtness beneﬁts on other individuals are largely restricted to kin
groups; despite several decades of research, evidence for reciprocal
altruism in pair-wise repeated encounters
4,5 remains scarce
6–8. Like-
wise, there is little evidence so far that individual reputation
building affects cooperation in animals, which contrasts strongly
with what we ﬁnd in humans. If we randomly pick two human
strangersfromamodernsocietyandgivethemthechancetoengage
inrepeated anonymousexchangesinalaboratoryexperiment,there




and reputation-based cooperation, taking the form of strong
reciprocity
11,12. Strong reciprocity is a combination of altruistic
rewarding, which is a predisposition to reward others for coopera-
tive, norm-abiding behaviours, and altruistic punishment, which is
a propensity to impose sanctions on others for norm violations.
Strong reciprocators bear the cost of rewarding or punishing even if
they gain no individual economic beneﬁt whatsoever from their
acts.Incontrast,reciprocalaltruists,astheyhavebeendeﬁnedinthe
biological literature
4,5, reward and punish only if this is in their
long-term self-interest. Strong reciprocity thus constitutes a power-
ful incentive for cooperation even in non-repeated interactions and
when reputation gains are absent, because strong reciprocators will
reward those who cooperate and punish those who defect.
The ﬁrst part of this review is devoted to the experimental
evidence documenting the relative importance of repeated encoun-
ters, reputation formation, and strong reciprocity in human altru-
ism. Throughout the paper we relyon a behavioural—in contrast to
a psychological
13—deﬁnition of altruism as being costly acts that
confer economic beneﬁts on other individuals. The role of kinship
in human altruism is not discussed because it is well-known that
humans share kin-driven altruismwith many other animals
14,15.W e
will show that the interaction between selﬁsh and strongly recipro-
calindividualsisessentialforunderstandingofhumancooperation.
We identify conditions under which selﬁsh individuals trigger the
breakdown of cooperation, and conditions under which strongly
reciprocal individuals have the power to ensure widespread
cooperation. Next we discuss the limits of human altruism that
arise from the costs of altruistic acts. Finally, we discuss the
evolutionary origins of the different forms of human altruism. We
are particularly interested in whether current evolutionary models
can explain why humans, but not other animals, exhibit large-scale
cooperation among genetically unrelated individuals, and to what
extent the evidence supports the key aspects of these models.
Proximate patterns
Altruistic behaviour in real-life circumstances can almost always be
attributed to different motives. Therefore, sound knowledge about
the speciﬁc motives behind altruistic acts predominantly stems
from laboratory experiments. In the following, we ﬁrst discuss
experiments inwhich interactions among kin, repeatedencounters,
and reputation formation have been ruled out. Next, we document
how the possibility of future encounters and individual reputation
formation changes subjects’behaviour. Inall experiments discussed
below, real money, sometimes up to three months’ income
16–18, was
at stake. Subjects never knew the personal identities of those with
whom they interacted and they had full knowledge about the
structure of the experiment—the available sequence of actions and
the prevailing information conditions. If, for example, the experi-
ment ruled out future encounters between the same individuals,
subjects were fully informed about this. To rule out any kind of
social pressure,the design of theexperimenteven ensuredinseveral
instances that the experimenter could not observe subjects’ indi-




21 nicely illustrates that a sizeable number of
people from a wide variety of cultures
22,23 even when facing high
monetary stakes
16,17, are willing to punish others at a cost to
themselves to prevent unfair outcomes or to sanction unfair
behaviour. In this game, two subjects have to agree on the division
of a ﬁxed sum of money. Person A, the proposer, can make exactly
one proposal of how to divide the money. Then person B, the
responder, can accept or reject the proposed division. In the case of
rejection, both receive nothing, whereas in the case of acceptance,
the proposal is implemented. A robust result in this experiment is
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available money are rejected with a very high probability. This
shows that responders do not behave to maximize self-interest,
because a selﬁsh responder would accept any positive share. In
general, the motive indicated for the rejection of positive, yet ‘low’,
offers is that responders view them as unfair. Most proposers seem
to understand that low offers will be rejected. Therefore, the equal
split is often the modal offer in the ultimatum game. The decisive
role of rejections is indicated by the dictator game, in which the
proposer unilaterally dictates the division of the money because the
responder cannot reject the offer. The average amount given to the
responders in the dictator game is much lower than that in the
ultimatum game
20,24.
Rejections in the ultimatum game can be viewed as altruistic acts
becausemostpeopleviewtheequalsplitasthefairoutcome.Thus,a
rejectionofalowofferiscostlyfortheresponderanditpunishesthe
proposer for the violation of a social norm. As a consequence, the
proposer is likely to obey the norm in the future by making less
greedy offers. For the purpose of this review, we ran an experiment
with ten proposers who met a different responder in ten successive
rounds. We observed that proposers who experienced a rejection in
the previous round increased their offers in the current round by
7% of the available sum of money.
In the ultimatum game, the proposer’s action directly affects the
responder. However, a key element of the enforcement of many
social norms, such as food-sharing norms in hunter-gatherer
societies
2,3, is that people punish norm violators not for what they
did to the punisher but for what they did to others
25,26. Norm
enforcement involves the punishment of norm violations even by
those who are not economically affected by the violation. To study
this question experimentally, we conducted a third-party punish-
ment game involving three subjects—an allocator, a recipient, and a
third party.
27 The allocator is endowed with 100 monetary units
(MUs), the recipient has no endowment, and the third party is
endowed with 50MUs. The allocator is free to give whatever he
wants to the ‘poor’ recipient. After the third party has been
informed about the allocator’s transfer to the recipient, he can
spend money to punish the allocator. Every MU spent on punish-
ment reduces the allocator’s income by three MUs. Because it is
costly to punish, no selﬁsh third party will ever punish. But if a
fairness norm applies to the situation, altruistic punishers are
expected to punish unfair transfers. In fact, 55% of the third parties
punish the allocator for transfers below 50, and the lower the
transfer, the higher the punishment (Fig. 1). Moreover, between
70 and 80% of the recipients expect that allocators will be punished
for unfairly low transfers. Similar results have been observed when
third parties are given the chance to punish subjects in a ‘prisoners’
dilemma’
27. In this case, they frequently punish a defector if his
opponent cooperated. If it is anticipated, the punishment by third
parties thus deters non-cooperation.
Altruistic rewarding
Sequentially played social dilemmas are a powerful tool for the
study of altruistic rewarding. They come in various forms—as gift
exchange games
28, trust games
29 or sequentially played prisoners’
dilemmas
30—but the basic structure is captured by the following
example.Thereisatrusterandatrustee,bothofwhomareendowed
with 10MUs. First, the truster decides how many, if any, MUs to
transfer to the trustee. Then the trustee decides how much of his
endowment to send to the truster. The experimenter doubles any
amount sent to the other subject so that, collectively, the two
subjects are best off if both transfer their whole endowment: if
both keep what they have, each one earns 10; if both transfer their
whole endowment, each earns 20. However, a selﬁsh trustee will
transfer nothing regardless of how much he received and, therefore,
a selﬁsh truster who anticipates this behaviour will never transfer
anything in the ﬁrst place.
This experiment mimics the essence of a vast number of real-life
situations.Asimilarstructurecharacterizesanysequentialexchange
that takes place in the absence of contracts that are enforced by the
courts. In these situations, both players are better off exchanging
their goods and favours but there is also a strong temptation to
cheat.Despitetheincentivetocheat,however,morethan50%ofthe
trustees transfer money and their transfers are the higher the more
the truster transferred initially
28–30. Like altruistic punishment, the
presence of altruistic rewarding has also been documented in many
different countries
31, in populations with varying demographic
characteristics
32, and under stake levels approaching 2–3 months’
income
18.
Strong reciprocity and multilateral cooperation
A decisive feature of hunter-gatherer societies is that cooperation is
not restricted to bilateral interactions. Food-sharing, cooperative
hunting, and warfare involve large groups of dozens or hundreds of
individuals
1. To what extent does strong reciprocity contribute to
cooperation in public goods situations involving larger groups of
individuals? By deﬁnition, a public good can be consumed by every
groupmemberregardlessofthemember’scontributiontothegood.
Therefore, each member has an incentive to free-ride on the
contributions of others. Altruistic rewarding in this situation
implies that an individual’s contributions increase if the expected
contributions from the other group members increase. Individuals
reward others if the latter are expected to raise their cooperation.
In public goods experiments that are played only once, subjects
typically contribute between 40 and 60% of their endowment,
although selﬁsh individuals are predicted to contribute nothing
33.
There is also strong evidence that higher expectations about others’
contributions induce individual subjects to contribute more
33–35.
Cooperationis, however,rarelystableanddeteriorates torather low
levels if the game is played repeatedly (and anonymously) for ten
rounds
36,37.
The most plausible interpretation of the decay of cooperation is
based on the fact that a large percentage of the subjects are strong
reciprocators but that there are also many total free-riders who
never contribute anything
35. Owing to the existence of strong
reciprocators, the ‘average’ subject increases his contribution levels
in response to expected increases in the average contribution of
other group members.Yet, owing tothe existenceof selﬁshsubjects,
the intercept and the steepness of this relationship is insufﬁcient to
establish an equilibrium with high cooperation (Fig. 2). In round
Figure 1 Altruistic punishment by third parties who are not directly affected by the
violationofafairnessnorm(basedonref.27).Thefairtransferlevelisgivenby50MUs.
The more the allocator’s transfer falls short of the fair level of 50MUs, the more third
parties punish the allocator. The recipients of the transfer also expect that the
allocators will be punished for unfair transfers.
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cooperation but, given the aggregate pattern of behaviours, this
expectation will necessarily be disappointed, leading to a break-
down of cooperation over time.
This breakdown of cooperation provides an important lesson.
Despite the fact that there are a large number of strong reciproca-
tors, they cannot prevent the decay of cooperation under these
circumstances. In fact, it can be shown theoretically that in a
population with a clear majority of strong reciprocators, a small
minority of selﬁsh individuals sufﬁces to render zero cooperation
the unique equilibrium
38. This implies that it is not possible to infer
the absence of altruistic individuals from a situation in which we
observe little cooperation. If strong reciprocators believe that no
one else will cooperate, they will also not cooperate. To maintain
cooperation in n-person interactions, the upholding of the belief
thatallormostmembersofthegroupwillcooperateisthusdecisive.
Any mechanism that generates such a belief has to provide
cooperation incentives for the selﬁsh individuals. The punishment
of non-cooperators in repeated interactions
39–41 or altruistic punish-
ment
27,42 provide two such possibilities. If cooperators have the
opportunity to target their punishment directly towards those who
defect they impose strong sanctions on the defectors. Thus, in the
presence of targeted punishment opportunities, strong reciprocators
are capable of enforcing widespread cooperation by deterring poten-
tial non-cooperators
39,40,42. In fact, it can be shown theoretically that
even a minority of strong reciprocators sufﬁces to discipline a
majority of selﬁsh individuals when direct punishment is possible
38.
Repeated interactions and reputation formation
A reputation for behaving altruistically is another powerful mecha-
nism for theenforcement ofcooperationinpublicgoodssituations.
If people are engaged in bilateral encounters as well as in n-person
public goods interactions, a defection in the public goods situation,
if known by others, may decrease others’ willingness to help in
bilateral interactions
43. Suppose that aftereach round of interaction
in a public goods experiment, subjects play an indirect reciprocity
game
44.Inthisgame,subjectsarematchedinpairsandonesubjectis
randomly placed in the role of a donor and the other in the role of a
recipient. The donorcan help the recipient, and the donor’s costs of
helping are lower than the beneﬁts for the recipient. The recipient’s
reputation is established by his decision in the previous public
goods round and his history of helping decisions in the indirect
reciprocity game. It turns out that the recipients’ reputations in the
public goods game are an important determinant for the donors’
decisions. Donors punish the recipients by being signiﬁcantly less
likely to help when the recipients defected in the previous public
goods game. This, in turn, has powerful cooperation-enhancing
effects in the future rounds of the public goods game.
Helping behaviour in indirect reciprocity experiments has also
been documented in the absence of interactions in public goods
games
45,46. A crucial element in these experiments is that direct
reciprocity is ruled out because no recipient will ever be put in a
position where he can give to one of his previous donors. Helping
rates between 50 and 90% have been achieved and recipients with a
historyofgeneroushelpingdecisionsaresigniﬁcantly morelikely to
receive help themselves. This suggests that the donors’ behaviour
may be driven by the desire to acquire a good reputation. However,
it is also possible that altruistic rewarding drives helping behaviour.
A recent study examines this question by allowing only half of the
subjectsintheexperimenttoacquireareputation
47.Thismeansthat
one can compare the behaviour of donors who cannot gain a
reputation with the behaviour of those who can. The data show
that both altruistic rewarding and reputation-seeking are powerful
determinants of donors’ behaviour. Donors who cannot acquire a
reputation help in 37% of the cases whereas those who can gain a
reputation help in 74% of the cases. These results indicate that
humans are very attentive to possibilities of individual reputation
formation in the domain of rewarding behaviours. They exhibit a
sizeable baseline level of altruistic rewarding, and when given the
opportunity to gain a reputation for being generous, helping rates
increasestrongly.Humansaresimilarlyattentivetothepossibilityof
repeated interactions with the same individual (reciprocal altru-
ism). The cooperation rate is much higher in social dilemmas if
subjectsknowthatthereisapossibilityofmeetingthesamepartners
again in future periods
10.
Little is known about repetition and reputation effects in the
domain of punishing behaviours. We conducted a series of ten
ultimatum games in two conditions for this purpose—a reputation
condition and a baseline condition. In both conditions, 10MUs
have to be divided in every period and every proposer is matched
with a new responder in each of the ten games. In the reputation
condition, the proposers are informed about the current respon-
der’s past rejection behaviour, whereas this knowledge is absent in
the baseline condition. This means that the responders in the
reputation condition can gain an individual reputation for being
tough bargainers by rejecting even high offers. A responder who
incurs the short-term cost of a rejection can gain the long-term
beneﬁtsofa‘good’reputationbyinducingfutureproposerstomake
him better offers. Because this economic beneﬁt is absent in the
baseline condition, subjects who understand the logic of reputation
formationwillexhibithigheracceptancestandardsinthereputation
condition.
In both conditions, the responders indicated an acceptance
threshold in each period, that is, the smallest amount they were
willingtoaccept.Theresultsshowthatwhenthesubjectswereinthe
baseline condition ﬁrst, the average acceptance threshold was about
3MUs, whereas if they entered the reputation condition, their
thresholds immediately jumped to more than 4MUs (Fig. 3a).
This jump in the thresholds forced the proposers to increase their
offers. Similarly, if the reputation condition took place ﬁrst, the
averagethresholdsimmediatelydecreasedwhensubjectsenteredthe
baseline condition (Fig. 3a). Moreover, this change in the average
Figure 2 The decay of cooperation over time. Subjects are heterogeneous with regard
to their willingness to reward altruistically. This results in the relationship between the
expected average contribution of other group members to the public good and the
contribution of a representative individual (the average conditional contribution
indicated by the purple line). Initially, individuals expect high average contribution
rates, say 80% of the endowment. On average, this induces them to contribute 50%.
Therefore, expectations are disappointed which leads to a downwards revision of
expectations to say, 50% of the endowment. Yet, if individuals expect 50% they will in
fact only contribute roughly 30%, causing a further downwards revision of
expectations. The process stops at the intersection point with the 458 line, which
determines the equilibrium level of altruistic cooperation in this setting.
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that the vast majority of responders (82%, n  94) increase
the threshold in the reputation condition relative to the baseline
(Fig. 3b) while the remaining minority keep the thresholds roughly
constant. These results suggest that altruistic punishers clearly
understand that if individual reputation building is possible, it
pays to acquire a reputation as a tough bargainer. This also means
that their rejections in the baseline condition cannot be attributed
tocognitiveproblemsinunderstanding whenindividualreputation
matters and when it does not.
Limits of human altruism
Strongly reciprocal individuals reward and punish in anonymous
one-shot interactions. Yet they increase their rewards and punish-
ment in repeated interactions or when their reputation is at stake.
This suggests that a combination of altruistic and selﬁsh concerns
motivates them. Their altruistic motives induce them to cooperate
andpunishinone-shotinteractionsandtheirselﬁshmotivesinduce
them to increase rewards and punishment in repeated interactions
or when reputation-building is possible. If this argument is correct,
we should also observe that altruistic acts become less frequent as
their costs increase. At a higher cost, individuals have to give up
more of their own payoff to help others, so that the individuals will
exhibit less altruistic behaviour for a given combination of selﬁsh
andaltruisticmotives.Theevidencefromdictatorgamesandpublic
goodgamesconﬁrmsthisprediction.Iftheownpayoffthatneedsto
be invested to produce one unit of the public good increases,
subjects invest less into the public good
36,37. Likewise, if the cost
of transferring one MU to the recipient in the dictator game
increases, the dictators give less money to the recipients
48.
Proximate theories
Altruistic rewards and punishment imply that individuals have
proximate motives beyond their economic self-interest—their sub-




only recently been developed. These theories formalize notions of
inequity aversion
38,50 and reciprocal fairness
51–53. They predict, for
example, that many subjects in the prisoners’ dilemma prefer
mutual cooperation over unilateral defection, even though it is in
their economic self-interest to defect regardless of what the other
playerdoes.Thispredictionissupportedbytheevidence
30,54andhas
wide-ranging implications. If the players have such preferences, the
game is no longer a prisoners’ dilemma but an assurance game in
which both mutual defection as well as mutual cooperation are
equilibria. The crucial point is that such subjects are willing to
cooperate if they believe that their opponent will cooperate and,
therefore, mutual cooperation is an equilibrium. However, because
mutual defection is also an equilibrium, it depends on the individ-
uals’ beliefs about the other players’ actions as to whether the
mutual cooperation or the mutual defection equilibrium is played.
Recent results on the neurobiology of cooperation in the prison-
ers’dilemmasupporttheviewthatindividualsexperienceparticular
subjective rewards from mutual cooperation
55. If subjects achieve
the mutual cooperation outcome with another human subject, the
brain’s reward circuit (components of the mesolimbic dopamine
system including the striatum and the orbitofrontal cortex) is
activated relative to a situation in which subjects achieve mutual
cooperation with a programmed computer. Moreover, there is also
evidence indicating a negative response of the dopamine system if a
subject cooperates but the opponent defects.
Evolutionary origins
What are the ultimate origins behind the rich patterns of human
altruism described above? It must be emphasized in the context of
this question that a convincing explanation of the distinct features
of human altruism should be based on capacities which are
distinctly human—otherwise there is the risk of merely explaining
animal, not human, altruism.
Reciprocal altruism
Reciprocal altruism
4,5 in the form of tit-for-tat or similar
cooperation-sustaining strategies in the repeated prisoners’
dilemma is a powerful ultimate explanation for human altruism
in small and stable groups. The experimental evidence unambigu-
ously shows that subjects cooperate more in two-person inter-
actions if future interactions are more likely
9,10.T h e r ea r e ,
however, several aspects of human interactions that point towards
the need to go beyond reciprocal altruism: ﬁrst, with a few excep-
tions
26,56, the evolutionary analysis of repeated encounters has been
largely restricted to two-person interactions but the human case
clearly demands the analysis of larger groups. Unfortunately, the
Figure 3 Responders’ acceptance thresholds in the ultimatum game with and without
reputation opportunities. a, Time trend of acceptance thresholds. If the control
treatment without the opportunity to build an individual reputation for toughness is
conducted ﬁrst, the responders reject offers below 3MUs (open blue symbols).
Immediatelyafter the implementationof reputation buildingopportunitiesin period11,
the acceptance thresholds jump up to more than 4MUs, indicating the desire to be
known as a ‘tough’ responder (solid blue symbols). If the reputation treatment comes
ﬁrst(purplesymbols)theremovaloftheopportunitytoacquireareputationimmediately
causesadecreaseinresponders’acceptancethresholds.b,Individuallevelchangesin
responders’ average acceptance thresholds. The relative size of the circles represents
the frequency of observations behind a circle. Responders who increase their average
acceptance threshold in the reputation condition relative to the baseline condition
generateadatapointabovethe458line.Thevastmajorityofrespondersincreasetheir
thresholdswhentheycangainareputationfortoughness.Onlyasmallminoritylowers
the thresholds or keeps them roughly constant.
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cooperation is extremely limited even in relatively small groups of
4–8 individuals. It turns out that in a repeated n-person prisoners’
dilemma, the only conditionally cooperative, evolutionarily stable
strategy prescribes cooperation only if all other group members
cooperated in the previous period. The basin of attraction of this
strategy is extremely small because a few selﬁsh players sufﬁce to
undermine the cooperation of the conditional cooperators.
56
Second, the interacting individuals are forced to stay together for
a random number of periods
6. This assumption is not only violated
by many, if not most, animal interactions but it is also clearly
violated in the case of humans. Throughout evolutionary history,
humans almost always had the option to stop interacting with
genetically unrelated individuals. Thus, the choice of cooperation
partners has to be modelled explicitly, which brings issues of
reputation formation to the forefront of the analysis. Recent




Third, reciprocal altruism relies on the idea that altruistic
behaviour creates economic beneﬁts for the altruist in the future.
Therefore, it has difﬁculties explaining strongly reciprocal beha-
viour, which is characterized by the absence of future net beneﬁts.
Reciprocalaltruism couldonlyexplain strong reciprocity if humans
behaveasifcooperationprovidesfuturenetbeneﬁts,althoughthere
are none objectively. The ethnographic evidence suggests that—
depending on the interaction partner—humans faced many differ-
ent probabilities of repeated encounters so that situations often
aroseinwhichdefectionwasthebeststrategy
58.Indeed,thevery fact
that humans seem to have excellent cheating detection abilities
59
suggests that, despite many repeated interactions, cheating has been
amajorproblemthroughouthumanevolution.Therefore,humans’
behavioural rules are likely to be ﬁne-tuned to the variations
in cheating opportunities, casting doubt on the assumption
that humans systematically overestimate the future beneﬁts from
current altruistic behaviours.
Reputation-seeking
Evolutionary approaches to reputation-based cooperation
44,60–64
represent important steps beyond reciprocal altruism. The indirect
reciprocity model
44,60,61 relies on the idea that third parties reward
individuals with an altruistic reputation if they can acquire a good




a considerable part of human altruism is driven by concerns about
reputation. Yet there are still some unsolved theoretical problems
that point towards the need for further research. First, the indirect
reciprocity approach produces long-run helping rates of roughly
40%iftherecipient’sbeneﬁtisfourtimesthedonor’scost,provided
that all individuals live in isolated groups without any migration. If,
however, genetic mixing between the groups occurs, helping rates
decline dramatically and approach zero
61. It would be an important
step forward if the indirect reciprocity approach could be modiﬁed
in such a way that signiﬁcant helping rates could be maintained
under reasonable assumptions about migration between groups.
Second, the question of how to model the concept of a good
reputation remains open. For example, should an individual who
does not help a person with a bad reputation lose his good
reputation? Currently the image-scoring approach
44 gives an afﬁr-
mative answer to this question while others do not
61.
Third, reputation formation among humans is based on our
language capabilities. However, we can use our language to tell the
truth or to lie. Thus, what ensures that individuals’ reputations
provide a reasonably accurate picture of their past behaviours?
Fourth, the indirect reciprocity approach is limited to dyadic
cooperation. Therefore, it cannot currently explain cooperation in
larger groups. But recent experiments that connect the n-person
public good game with an indirect reciprocity game do point
towardsapotentialsolution
43.Finally,reputation-basedapproaches
cannot account for strong reciprocity unless one assumes that
humans behave as if they systematically overestimate the future
gains from current altruistic acts—an assumption that is dubious in
view of the experimental evidence.
Costly signalling theory also provides a reputation-based ulti-
mate explanation for altruistic behaviour
62,63. According to this
approach, individuals signal favourable, yet unobservable, traits
with altruistic acts, rendering them preferred mating partners or
helping in the recruitment of coalition partners in conﬂicts. The
assumption behind this theory is that individuals with better traits
have lower marginal signalling costs, that is, lowercosts of altruistic
acts. Thus, those with better traits are more likely to signal, which
allows the inference that those who signal have better traits on
average.Theadvantageofthisapproachisthatitcould,inprinciple,
explain contributions to n-person public goods. The weakness is
thatthesignallingofunobservabletraitsneednotoccurbyaltruistic
acts but can also take other forms. The approach, therefore,
generates multiple equilibria—in some equilibria, signalling occurs
via altruistic behaviour; in others, signalling does not involve any
altruistic acts. Therefore, this theory has difﬁculties explaining
human altruism unless it is supplemented with some other mecha-
nisms. One such mechanism might be cultural group selection
63.I f
groups where signalling takes place via altruistic behaviour have
better survival prospects, selection between groups favours those
groupswhich havesettledatapro-socialwithin-group equilibrium.
Since there is no within-group selection against the altruists at the
pro-social equilibrium, only weak effects of cultural selection
between groups are required here. There is evidence
66 from Meriam
turtle hunters that is consistent with costly signalling theory but so
far there is no experimental evidence for altruistic costly signalling.
Gene–culture coevolution
The birth of modern sociobiology is associated with scepticism
against genetic group selection
67; although it is possible in theory,
and in spite of a few plausible cases
25, genetic group selection has
generally been deemed unlikely to occur empirically. The main
argument has been that it can at best be relevant in small isolated
groups because migration in combination with within-group selec-
tionagainstaltruistsisamuchstrongerforcethanselectionbetween
groups. The migration of defectors to groups with a comparatively
large number of altruists plus the within-group ﬁtness advantage of
defectors quickly removesthegeneticdifferencesbetweengroupsso
that group selection has little effect on the overall selection of
altruistic traits
68. Consistent with this argument, genetic differences
between groups in populations of mobile vertebrates such as
humans are roughly what one would expect if groups were ran-
domly mixed
69. Thus, purely genetic group selection is, like the
gene-based approaches of reciprocal altruism and indirect recipro-
city, unlikely to provide a satisfactory explanation for strong
reciprocity and large-scale cooperation among humans. However,
the arguments against genetic group selection are far less persuasive
when applied to the selection of culturally transmitted traits.
Cultural transmission occurs through imitation and teaching, that
is, through social learning. There are apparent large differences in
cultural practices of different groups around the world and ethno-
graphic evidence indicates that even neighbouring groups are often
characterized by very different cultures and institutions
70.I n
addition, a culture-based approach makes use of the human
capacitytoestablishandtransmitbehaviouralnormsthroughsocial
learning—a capacity that is quantitatively, and probably even
qualitatively, distinctly human
1,71.
Recent theoretical models of cultural group selection
72,73 or of
gene–culture coevolution
71,74 could provide a solution to the puzzle
of strong reciprocity and large-scale human cooperation. They are
review article
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norms or monogamy—are sustained by punishment and decisively
weaken the within-group selection against the altruistic trait. If
altruistic punishment is ruled out, cultural group selection is not
capableofgeneratingcooperationinlargegroups(Fig.4).Yet,when
punishment of non-cooperators and non-punishers is possible,
punishment evolves and cooperation in much larger groups can
be maintained
73. This is due to the fact that the altruistic punish-
ment of non-cooperators in combination with the imitation of
economically successful behaviours prevents the erosion of group
differences with regard to the relative frequency of cooperating
members.Ifthereareasufﬁcientnumberofaltruisticpunishers,the
cooperators do better than the defectors because the latter are
punished. Therefore, cooperative behaviour is more likely to be
imitated. Moreover, when cooperation in a group is widespread,
altruistic punishers have only a small or no within-group disadvan-
tage relative to pure cooperators who do not punish. At the limit,
when everybody cooperates, punishers incur no punishment costs
at all and thus have no disadvantage. Thus, small cultural group
selection effects sufﬁce to overcome the small cost disadvantage of
altruistic punishers that arises from the necessity of punishing
mutant defectors.
To what extent is there evidence for the role of culture and group
selection in human altruism? There is strong evidence from inter-
generational ultimatum and trust games that advice from players
who previously participated in the experiment increases altruistic
punishment and altruistic rewarding
75. Recent intergenerational
public good games where advice is given indicate that later gener-
ations achieve signiﬁcantly higher cooperation levels even in the
absence of punishment opportunities
76. Ultimatum and dictator
games with children of different ages show that older children are
moregenerousandmorewillingtopunishaltruistically
77.Although
these changes in children’s behaviour could be a result of genetic
developmentalprocesses,itseemsatleastasplausibletoassumethat
they are also a product of socialization by parents and peers. Why,
after all, do parents invest so much time and energy into the proper
socialization of their children if this effort is futile? Perhaps the
strongestevidencefor theroleofculturalnormscomesfromaseries
of experiments in 15 small-scale societies
23,s h o w i n gd e c i s i v e
differences across societies in the behaviour of proposers and
responders in the ultimatum game. Some tribes like the Hazda
from Tanzania exhibit a considerable amount of altruistic punish-
mentwhereastheMachiguengafromPerushowlittleconcernabout
fairsharing.Thus,takentogether,thereisfairlyconvincingevidence
that cultural forces exert a signiﬁcant impact on human altruism.
Yet, what is the evidence for cultural group selection? There is
quite strong evidence that group conﬂict and warfare were wide-
spread in foraging societies
78,79. There are also examples
70,80
suggesting that group conﬂict contributes to the cultural extinction
of groups because the winning groupsforce theircultural norms and
institutions on the losing groups. However, although these examples
are suggestive, they are not conclusive, so further evidence is needed.
If cultural group selection was a signiﬁcant force in evolution,
then the human propensity to reward and punish altruistically
should be systematically affected by inter-group conﬂicts. In par-
ticular, altruistic cooperation should be more prevalent if coopera-
tive acts contribute to success in a group conﬂict. Likewise, people
shouldbemorewillingtopunishdefectorsifdefectionoccursinthe
context of a group conﬂict. There is evidence from inter-group
conﬂict games indicating that altruistic cooperation in prisoners’
dilemmas indeed increases if the game is embedded in an inter-
group conﬂict
81. However, there is no evidence so far showing that
inter-group conﬂicts increase altruistic punishment.
Open questions
We now know a lot more about human altruism than we did one
decade ago. Thereis experimental evidence indicating that repeated
interactions, reputation-formation, and strong reciprocity are
powerful determinants of human behaviour. There are formal
models that capture the subtleties of interactions between selﬁsh
and strongly reciprocal individuals, and there is a much better
understanding about the nature of the evolutionary forces that
probably shaped human altruism. However, there are still a con-
siderable number of open questions. In view of the relevance of
cultural evolution, it is necessary to study the relationship between
cultural and economic institutions and the prevailing patterns of
human altruism. Although recent evidence
23 suggests that market
integration and the potential gains from cooperation are important
factors, our knowledge is still extremely limited. This limitation is
partly due to the fact that far too many experiments use students
from developed countries as participants. Instead, we need experi-
ments with participants that are representative of whole countries
or cultures and we need to combine behavioural measures of
altruism with individual-level demographic data and group-level
data about cultural and economic institutions. In view of the
theoretical importance of group conﬂicts and group reputation,
much more evidence on how these affect altruistic rewarding and
punishment is necessary. We also need more empirical knowledge
about the characteristics of the individual reputation acquired by
people and how others respond to this reputation.
At the ultimate level, the evolution and role of altruistic reward-
ing for cooperation in larger groups remains in the dark. Likewise,
the empirical study of altruistic rewarding has been largely limited
to dyadic interactions and little is known about howcooperation in
n-person public good situations is affected if subjects have the
opportunity to altruistically reward others after having observed
each others’contribution choices. Evolutionaryexplanations ofthis
kindofaltruisticrewardingarelikely tobemuchmoredifﬁcultthan
explanations of altruistic punishment because, when cooperation is
frequent, rewarding causes high costs for the altruists whereas a
crediblepunishmentthreatrendersactualpunishmentunnecessary.
Finally, to enhance the study of the evolution of human altruism,
Figure 4 Simulations of the evolution of cooperation in multi-person prisoners’
dilemmas with group conﬂicts and different degrees of altruistic punishment. The
simulationsarebasedonthemodelofref.73butweaddedthepossibilityofpunishing
the non-punishers. There are 64 groups of ﬁxed size n with n ranging from 2 to 512.
Theﬁgureshowstheaveragecooperationratein100independentsimulationsoverthe
last 1,000 of 2,000 generations. If the altruistic punishment of defectors is ruled out,
cooperation already breaks down for groups of size 16 and larger. If altruistic
punishment of defectors is possible, groups of size 32 can still maintain a cooperation
rate of 40%. However, the biggest impact from altruistic punishment prevails if non-
punishers can also be punished. In this case, even groups of several hundred
individuals can establish cooperation rates of between 70 and 80%.
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rigorously derived from the evolutionary models. A
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